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CURRENT POPULATION SITUATION 
AND FUTURE GROWTH
The Bangladesh population in mid-2007 was around 
147 million. The precise figure depends on assump-
tions about rates of growth since the adjusted cen-
sus figure of 129,247,233 for 22 January 2001. The 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) indicates an 
average rate of natural increase of 1.5% annually 
since the census. However, these figures from the 
BBS are almost certainly under-estimates of crude 
birth rate (CBR) (20-21/1,000) and crude death rate 
(CDR) (5-6/1,000). The BBS rates would project a 
population of just over 141 million whereas the 
Population Reference Bureau (PRB) rate of natural 
growth of 1.9% per annum is more likely—based 
on assumed CBR of 27/1,000 and CDR of 8/1,000, 
resulting in a projected population of 147 million.
Population projections
A more important question is what the future popu- 
lation growth will be. Until the United Nations 
Population Division (UN PD) released the 2004 revi-
sion of population projections for all the countries 
of the world, there was a general agreement that 
Bangladesh would reach 218 million by 2050 and 
finally stabilize at around 260 million in mid-next 
century (1). However, the 2004 revision by the UN 
PD proposes a pessimistic upgrading of the 2050 
figure to 243 million as a consequence of the de-
cade-long fertility plateau (1993-2002). This seems 
excessively high. The PRB estimate is 231 million 
for mid-century, which is more realistic, although 
a new set of Bangladesh population projections 
should be produced, taking into account the recent 
demographic events. Whatever the details, it can 
be seen in Figure 1 that Bangladesh is only halfway 
along the S-curve of the ‘demographic transition’ 
from a historically-stable population size of around 
25 million to a final size of 10-fold larger.
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ABSTRACT
Bangladesh currently has a population approaching 150 million and will add another 100 million before 
stabilizing, unless fertility can soon drop below replacement level. This level of fertility decline will require 
a change in marriage patterns, which have been minimal so far, even with increasing female schooling. It 
would also benefit from a long-awaited shift to long-term contraception. In addition to the consequence 
of huge population size, the density of population is already five times that of any other ‘mega’ country 
(>100 million), a very challenging situation for an agricultural society. Most of the future growth will be 
urban, increasingly in slums. Numbers of young people will not increase, but numbers of older people will 
increase 10-fold this century, creating a large burden on the health system, especially for chronic illnesses.   
High density of population means that agricultural land is virtually saturated, with very limited capacity to 
expand food production. Climate change may have dramatic impacts on agriculture, through flooding and 
drought resulting from weather changes and geopolitical influences on transborder rivers. Rising sea-levels 
and consequent salinity will affect crops and require shifts to alternative land use.  Serious long-term plan-
ning is needed for meeting the growing needs of the population, both for distribution and consumption.
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The UN projection would require an average an-
nual growth rate of 1.29% from today to 2050. As 
the CDR will not fall below 8/1,000, the CBR would 
have to remain, on average, at least 21/1,000 [The 
population growth rate (natural increase, not in-
cluding international migration) is the difference 
between CBR and CDR, expressed as a percentage, 
not per 1,000]. This is unlikely as even if the TFR 
remains at a plateau at replacement level through 
2050, the population-ageing process will bring the 
CBR down below 20 within a decade or so.  Simul-
taneously, the population-ageing process will start 
to push the CDR beyond 8/1,000 from around 
2020, which will further reduce the population 
growth rate.
Replacement fertility
It is worth noting that the exact year in which re-
placement fertility is achieved is not of great im-
portance. What is potentially of much greater im-
portance is whether or not fertility can be brought 
below replacement fertility. For example, if fertility 
stops declining on attaining replacement level, the 
final population will continue to increase for an-
other century and add at least 100 million. How-
ever, if fertility declined through replacement (i.e. 
TFR around 2.2) to the current level of Thailand 
(TFR around 1.8), the final population could stop 
growing at 205-210 million, some 50-55 million 
lower than otherwise will be the case.
Age structure and population momentum
A demographic change that has major implications 
is the rapid fertility decline of the 1980s.  The first 
impact has been to slow population growth, but it 
has resulted in a gradual change in age structure. 
An encouraging feature of the change to, or ‘age-
ing’ of the age structure, is the fact that the num-
ber of children and young people aged less then 
15 years—now at 47 million—will never increase. 
Throughout this century, that number will remain 
stable, which should assist planners in building an 
education system.  
A related feature of this age structure is that, with 
current low mortality rates, many of those 47 mil-
lion young people will survive and pass through 
the reproductive years and contribute to the con-
tinuing population growth, even if replacement 
fertility level is attained within a decade [Every 5-
year delay in achieving replacement fertility adds 
3% to the population projection]. To illustrate the 
significance of this, there are currently about 45 
million young women in the reproductive ages 
(15-49 years). By mid-century, this number will 
have increased to 75 million, as over 90% of young 
people who survive to age 15 years will survive to 
age 50 years.
Determinants of future population growth
Can changes in any other determinants of popu-
lation growth play an important role in what fu-
Key messages
•	 The	density	of	the	Bangladesh	population	is	
much higher than any other mega country.
•	 In	2007,	Bangladesh	was	only	halfway	up	
the population growth curve and will reach 
more than 250 million later this century.
•	 Most	of	the	increased	population	will	be	ur-
ban, and much of Bangladesh will essentially 
become a city state.
•	 The	 year	 that	 Bangladesh	 reaches	 replace-
ment fertility is not as critical lowering fer-
tility to less than replacement. Other Asian 
countries have accomplished this.
•	 The	number	of	children	born	each	year	is	now	
stabilized at slightly less than 4 million.
•	 Age	of	marriage	has	not	increased	in	Bangla-
desh as it has in other Asian countries.
•	 The	elderly	(>60	years)	will	grow	in	popula-
tion from 7 to 65 million this century, and 
this will make many demands and different 
demands on the health system. 
•	 There	has	been	a	major	reduction	in	overall	
numbers of child deaths over the last three 
decades. Part of this reduction is due to re-
duced fertility, and part is due to child-sur-
vival interventions.
Fig. 1. Population of Bangladesh: 10-fold growth
            in two centuries
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ture population growth will be in Bangladesh? The 
major components include fertility, mortality, and 
migration. 
Fertility
Following a dramatic and precipitous decline in the 
1980s from almost seven children per woman (late 
1970s) to just over three children per woman (ear-
ly 1990s), fertility has been stagnant for a decade. 
Demographers found it difficult to predict when a 
decline would restart. The usual indicators of future 
behaviour, such as reported ideal family size and 
unwanted fertility, did not indicate a very substan-
tial unmet need for fertility control; nor did the 
gradual decrease in gender preference, which still 
suggested a desire for at least one boy and one girl, 
which tends to result in an average fertility (TFR) of 
around three children, even if 70% of parents say 
that they only want one of each.  
The only indication of a coming restart of fertility 
decline was the continuing fall through the 1990s 
in the less widely-used parity progression ratios. In-
deed, the Demography and Health Survey (DHS) 
2004 showed a minor drop in TFR to 3.0, which 
was of borderline significance [The TFR from BDHS 
1999/2000 was 3.308 (3.159-3.457), and from 
BDHS 2004, it was 3.028 (2.894-3.161), meaning 
the 95% confidence interval barely touched at 
3.16]. The latest DHS, in 2007, has confirmed the 
resumption of the decline (Fig. 2), with a further 
fall to 2.7, still half a child above replacement fertil-
ity. This author suspects that fertility will continue 
to fall gradually to a TFR around 2.5, then possibly 
a plateau again for some time, as some other coun-
tries have seen. There is still reason to be hopeful 
that replacement fertility will be achieved by 2015, 
as was the target for the 1994 World Bank popula-
tion projections, although five years later than the 
1996 UN PD projections.
Family planning
A puzzling feature of the fertility plateau was the 
fact that contraceptive prevalence rates (CPRs) con-
tinued to rise steadily throughout the 1990s, from 
44.6% (1993/1994) to a peak of 58.1% in 2004, fol-
lowed by a slight fall to 55.8% in 2007, due to a 
fall in traditional methods. Experience from oth-
er countries suggests that such a rise in the CPR 
would produce a concurrent decline in fertility. Re-
cent studies have not satisfactorily explained this 
paradox. An examination of the range of fertility 
determinants indicates that potentially important 
factors, such as delayed age at marriage, do not ap-
pear to have played a counter-balancing role in the 
Bangladesh case; nor have less powerful factors, 
such as postpartum amenorrhoea linked to breast-
feeding, changed in any significant way. There has 
Fig. 2. Trends in fertility, Bangladesh, 1980-2007* 
*Data obtained from various sources; BFS= Bangladesh Fertility Survey; BMMS= Bangladesh Maternal Mortality Survey;
CPS= Contraceptive Prevalence Survey; DHS=Demography and Health Survey; HDS= Health and Demography Survey
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been a gradual shift in the use of permanent and 
long-term contraception towards a greater depen-
dence on temporary methods, but this is mainly 
among older fertile women who are not contribu- 
ting much to overall childbearing rates. One 
possible factor may be that adoption of modern 
contraception has gradually been substituting for 
reliance on induced abortion. This pattern, seen in 
Matlab (2,3), appears to require quite high levels 
of CPR before a substitution begins to take place. 
This may well be context-specific and presumably 
depends on the level of fertility and the speed of 
the decline. 
Are new indicators needed to monitor child 
survival
Traditional measures of child mortality use, as their 
denominator, the population ‘at risk’, that is the 
numbers of children born. Defining the ‘at-risk’ 
population is central to epidemiological concepts; 
however, it also assumes that live infants within 
the cohort are uniformly at risk. Many confound-
ers, such as age of parents, socioeconomic status, 
parity, and education of parents, alter this risk and, 
thus, affect the IMR. Since the acceptance of fami-
ly-planning methods may be highly dependent on 
these same factors, the use of the IMR when used 
as a single indicator is not able to assess the inter-
action of these factors. There are other indicators 
of infant mortality, termed fertility-adjusted infant 
mortality ratio (FIMR), age-specific, fertility-adjust-
ed IMR (AFIMR), and total infant mortality ratio 
(TIMR) which are more sensitive to rapid demo-
graphic changes and which take into account the 
combined effects of changes in both fertility and 
infant mortality rates on overall infant mortality in 
an entire region (4). These new indicators appear to 
better measure the effects of an integrated health 
programme. For the Matlab field area, the reduc-
tion in the numbers of infant deaths, as reflected 
by these indicators, is much greater than indicated 
by the IMR. Also, the new indicators conceptualize 
the mother-infant pair as an appropriate unit with 
which to monitor mortality and may be used for 
guiding allocation of resources intended to lower 
infant mortality and may better reflect the percep-
tion in infant mortality status in the community.
Age at marriage
In a country undergoing a major fertility transition, 
it is usual to see a gradual delay in age at marriage 
for young women. Bangladesh is unusual in that 
the traditional pattern of very early marriage and 
high fertility has been transformed with virtually 
no evidence of marriage being delayed. One impor-
tant indicator of early marriage is the proportion of 
teenage women (aged 15-19 years) currently mar-
ried. Bangladesh has, until recently, maintained 
one of the highest proportions—close to half—of 
teenage marriage in the world, matched only with 
a few West African countries.
What is surprising about this unchanging early-
marriage trend is that substantial investments have 
been made in the past decade to increase access by 
girls to primary and secondary education. Free pri-
mary schooling for girls to grade 12 (with plans to 
extend it to higher level) and a national female sec-
ondary school stipend scheme (FSSSS) which pro-
vides financial support to parents who keep their 
daughters in high school as long as possible, with 
the provision that the girl does not marry [There 
are other eligibility criteria, such as maintaining a 
minimum pass rate (45% or so)]. There is a draft 
policy proposing to extend this scheme to girls 
from poor families in urban areas. Thus far, there is 
little evidence of these educational inputs translat-
ing into delayed marriage, as the historical experi-
ence from other countries would predict.
It is probably safe to predict that continued invest-
ments in female education will result in delays in 
early marriage in the near future—at least among 
some groups. This, in turn, will contribute to fur-
ther fertility decline. What is less certain about mass 
education schemes, such as the FSSSS, is whether 
girls from poor families, who now achieve high lev-
els of education through such schemes, will behave 
similarly to girls who historically had high educa-
tion and tended to come from economically well-
off families with different knowledge, experience, 
and values. There easily could be a delay in observ-
ing later marriage among poor families. 
Ageing
Another less-widely discussed aspect of the ‘ageing’ 
of the population is the impending massive growth 
of the elderly sector, aged 60 years and over, during 
this century. Typical of most developing countries, 
the elderly of Bangladesh currently constitute only 
about one in 20 of the population. However, during 
this century, the current seven million will grow to 
65 million, by then accounting for some 26% of 
the total population (Fig. 3). This ‘ageing’ shift 
has major implications for health as more than half 
of all deaths occur in this age range.
It is partly this ageing trend that is triggering the 
shift from infectious to non-infectious diseases as 
the major causes of death. It is anticipated that, Streatfield PK and  Karar ZA Population challenges for Bangladesh
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by 2010, non-communicable diseases will account 
for 59% of all deaths, up from 40% in 1990. The 
proportion due to communicable diseases will 
drop from 51% to 30% over the same period. The 
remainder is due to injuries, which will increase a 
little, mainly as a result of more road accidents.
It can safely be assumed that, during this century, a 
health service system, probably incorporating some 
form of health insurance, will evolve in response 
to these new demands. Is this a safe assumption? 
Who is going to pay for these services, which will 
inevitably be much more expensive than existing 
services for most infectious diseases? While the el-
derly population grows at a rapid rate (2.2% per an-
num), the working-age population will grow much 
more slowly, only 0.5% per annum. The effect of 
this will be that the present dependency ratio will 
fall precipitously from 11 workers per one elderly 
person to three workers by 2050 and to two work-
ers by 2100—similar to current Western ratios. Even 
assuming an effective taxation system in place, the 
burden on workers to pay for health services will 
be greatly increased. In the next section, the impli-
cations of ageing for health services will be briefly 
discussed.
Implications of population growth and ageing 
for health systems
There will be two ways in which population growth 
impacts patterns of disease and the need for health 
services. One is simply the increase in numbers, 
around 38% over the coming three decades. The 
other is the impact of the changing age structure. A 
simple exercise will illustrate these two effects. Ap-
plying the WHO GBD age-specific prevalence rates 
for diabetes for South Asia to the growing Bangla-
desh population, then applying costs per case of 
treatment (at current retail prices and assuming all 
cases receive complete treatment), suggest that the 
number of cases will rise from 2.7 million in 2005 
to 7.1 million in 2035. The implied costs will rise 
from US$ 154 million to US$ 405 million (@US$ 57 
per case). This is a 162% increase in health costs, of 
which only one-quarter is due to growth in overall 
numbers, plus three-quarters due to ‘ageing’ of the 
population.
The impact of ageing is not limited to non-com-
municable diseases, but infectious diseases that 
afflict adults, such as tuberculosis (TB), are also 
important. Using the same approach, the costs of 
complete TB treatment for all cases would rise by 
76% from US$ 33.7 million to US$ 59.6 million, 
of which half the impact would be due to the in-
crease in numbers of population and half due to 
the changing age structure.  
The impact of ageing is much greater with diabe-
tes than TB because the age-specific rates rise much 
more steeply with diabetes, and it is not presently 
a curable disease, so the duration needed for man-
agement is much longer.
While the rapidly-rising number of cases of both 
non-communicable and communicable diseases of 
adults has major cost implications for the health 
system, it also suggests that issues relating to skill 
balances and medical school curriculum need to 
take account of the changing demands.
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
POPULATION AND URBANIZATION
Not only are the total population figures important, 
their distribution between urban and rural areas is 
also critical. Overall growth may continue through 
the present century, but the rural population will 
stop growing by 2025, adding ‘only’ another 30 
million to the current 108 million. The urban 
population, however, will absorb the additional 70 
million national population growth, so the current 
urban population of 34 million will blow out to 
over 100 million, possibly during this century. This 
frightening growth will be driven predominantly 
by rural-urban migration, with a small component 
of natural increase.
How can urban populations grow at this rate, tri-
pling in size within this century? The current rate 
of growth of the urban areas within the six metro-
Fig. 3. Bangladesh population (millions) in 21st
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politan areas is around 3.5% per annum. The BBS 
quotes a rate of natural increase for urban Bangla-
desh of about 1.3% per annum. If this estimate is 
correct, the difference (2.2% per annum) must come 
from rural-urban migration. This gives a doubling 
time of 20 years [The doubling time is estimated by 
dividing the annual growth rate in percentage into 
69.3, or 70. Populations grow exponentially, and 
the natural log of 2 is 0.693], or a tripling time is 
about 31 years. So, a doubling is probable by mid-
century at the current growth rate. More important 
even than the overall urban growth rate is that the 
slum populations within the urban areas are grow-
ing at double the average urban rate—around 7% 
per annum. For example, in Dhaka, more than one-
third (37.4%) of the 9,136,182 population in the 
metropolitan area currently live in slums. Nation-
wide, that proportion is similar, at 35.2%, although 
in other divisions the proportions are lower (Khul-
na City Corporation=19.5%). The growth rate for 
urban Dhaka indicates that, in absolute terms, 
it is growing at around 320,000 persons per annum 
in the metropolitan area, of which three-quarters 
are added to the slum population. This proportion 
is likely to be similar elsewhere, although the total 
numbers will, of course, be smaller than in Dhaka.   
Figure 4, showing Bangladesh with a current popu-
lation density of 2,600 per sq mile, supports the 
argument that Bangladesh is a special case in that 
its economy is very much based on agriculture, but 
its exceptional population density places it at great 
risk of reaching saturation in terms of agricultural 
production and capacity to absorb further popula-
tion increases into the rural labour force [To place 
the Bangladesh population density in perspective, 
if the entire world population was squeezed into 
the USA, the density would be 1,740, or into Aus-
tralia, the density would be 2,170 per sq mile; The 
population density of Bangladesh will rise from 
2,700 to 4,500 per sq mile by 2050].
There is a slightly encouraging sign that urban 
growth appears to be slowing in recent years. While 
there is little evidence, this is possibly linked to the 
rapidly-expanding microcredit facilities in rural ar-
eas, and consequent employment and income-gen-
eration taking some pressure off the poor to move 
to the cities in search of work.
Urban health conditions and challenges
The health of the urban poor or slum dwellers is 
primarily due to crowding and lack of access to 
basic services, such as water and sanitation. Con-
sequences of these living conditions include stress 
due to crowding, insecurity due to lack of housing 
and land tenure, various types of illegal or criminal 
activities, including violence, drug-use, prostitu-
tion, etc.
If conditions are so bad, why do people move to 
these areas? Presumably because there are better 
(perceived) chances to find cash from employ-
ment.
Population density and crowding
Rural Bangladesh has a relatively high population 
density of 755 per sq km This is sparse compared 
to the urban population densities from the lat-
est slum-mapping (5), which are 30 times higher, 
Fig. 4. 'Mega' countries with population of >100 million
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averaging 23,378 nationwide (7,152 in Barisal City 
Corporation to 29,857 in Dhaka metropolitan). 
The slums, however, at 205,415 persons per sq km, 
are almost 300 times more densely populated than 
the rural averages. Figure 5 illustrates the point that 
metres below the surface [One positive aspect of this 
low water table is that it is below the level of arsenic 
contamination of the shallow aquifer, down to 30 
metres], some 20 metres lower than eight years ago, 
and 35 metres lower than in the mid-1970s. Sur-
face water should be a viable alternative [There is 
a proposal to import relatively clean surface water 
from areas to the south-west of Dhaka city, as the 
Shitalakshya river has reached its extraction limit 
due to pollution and siltation]. However, surface 
water is contaminated by industrial wastes (mostly 
toxic chemical dyes, heavy metals, etc.) and domes-
tic wastes due to the inadequate sewerage system.
Only Chittagong and Dhaka are the two cities with 
any piped, water-based sewerage system, but it is 
very old and poorly maintained. Only 30% of city 
residents live in areas served by the sewerage sys-
tem, another 30% have septic tanks, and the rest 
lack even basic sanitation, further exacerbating the 
pollution of surface water.
While the recommended allowance of water is 
around 200 L/day per person (for all purposes), 
many slum-dwellers manage with less than 10 
L/day. With the Dhaka population increasing by 
over 300,000 persons each year, theoretically need-
ing six million additional litre per day, the num-
bers limited to this inadequate amount or less, will 
undoubtedly increase, unless something drastic is 
done.
The health implications must be clear, where popu-
lations are growing, water is becoming increasingly 
scarce, and sanitation is poor and not improving, 
waterborne diseases are very likely to become a seri-
ous problem again.
In addition, air-borne diseases, such as influenza, 
pneumonia, and TB, which tend to be exacerbated 
by crowding, are obviously also likely to increase 
under these pressured conditions.
CARRYING CAPACITY OF THE 
BANGLADESH POPULATION
There can be no doubt that the continued growth 
of the large population of Bangladesh has major 
implications in the future development of the 
country. Questions that are not often asked are 
what population can Bangladesh support; what 
strategies might be used for minimizing the nega-
tive impact of future population growth; and what 
changes to population distribution and the econo-
my will be needed.
Fig. 5. Korail slum in Dhaka
Photo credit: Peter Kim Streatﬁeld
most slum housing is single-story, not high-rise 
and, thus, very crowded. Chittagong is the highest 
at 255,100 persons per sq km. With modal (most 
common) values of 4-5 persons per room and the 
average house-size of 103 sq ft, there can be little 
doubt that crowding is a genuine issue.
Since slums tend to be in low-lying areas, where the 
better-off do not want to live, they are subject to 
flooding (26.5% fully flooded, 27.4% partly flood-
ed, 46.1% flood-free), with over half of the area 
being poorly drained (52.7%, plus 37.0% moder-
ately drained). More than half (55.7%) have no 
fixed place for the disposal of garbage. More than 
half (52.8%) of the population use a pit latrine for 
sanitation, and in many households, these must 
be shared—in one in eight slums, one latrine was 
shared, on average, by 11 or more families.
What are the prospects for this situation with future 
rapid urban growth? Water is likely to be a limiting 
factor. At present, the people of Dhaka city need 
2.1 billion litre of water a day (L/day). Dhaka WASA 
provides 1.45 billion L/day, mostly from ground-
water through its 400 deep tubewells, and the re-
mainder is from the Shitalakshya River, which is 
becoming increasingly polluted. Many additional 
deep tubewells are serving the mushrooming num-
bers of high-rise buildings, and the overall impact 
of extraction of this underground water at a rate 
exceeding the capacity to recharge the aquifer is a 
drawdown of the Dhaka water table at an unsus-
tainable rate. The water table is presently over 60 Streatfield PK and  Karar ZA Population challenges for Bangladesh
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There are several issues that throw light on this. 
What is the capacity of agriculture to generate em-
ployment and absorb the expanding population 
into gainful employment? What is the capacity of 
agriculture to feed the growing population?
Bangladesh has 8.774 million hectares of cultivable 
land, of which 88% is cultivated, so there is a limi-
ted scope to expand the cultivated area. Intensive 
double (59%) and triple (22%) cropping increases 
the effective crop production by 150%. Has Ban-
gladesh reached the limits of agriculture? This may 
depend in the short term more than anything else 
on the availability of water [In the longer-term, the 
shift to genetically-engineered or modified crops 
might play a role in Bangladesh, just as the intro-
duction of high-yielding rice varieties did in the 
1970s and 1980s].
Bangladesh resides in a water paradox in that it re-
ceives massive volumes of water both from trans-
boundary rivers and from monsoon rains (average 
2.3 metres annually), but water shortages are com-
mon. Among the 57 transboundary rivers are the 
Ganges [The Ganges carries so much water into 
Bangladesh that the Paksey bridge near the Indian 
border needs the deepest pylons in the world—91 
metres below the riverbed], the Brahmaputra, and 
the Megna, with peak discharges among the highest 
in the world according to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (6). Between these and other minor 
rivers, some 1,100 km3 of water enters Bangladesh 
annually, mostly during the monsoon (June-Octo-
ber). To put this in perspective, it is equivalent to 
covering the entire country in water to a depth of 
7.5 metres.
How can there be water shortages? There are two 
reasons. The first is that, across the 230 rivers, dams 
capture less than 2% of internal renewable water 
resources. Irrigation is used on only half the poten-
tially-irrigable land area, and major canals cover less 
than 10% of the total irrigated area. The remaining 
area uses minor irrigation systems, with pumps for 
groundwater, shallow and deep wells of various 
kinds. However, a concern is that “there has been 
a general reduction in the area irrigated by wells as 
a consequence of aquifer drawdown, and there has 
been an increase in salinity, particularly along the 
coastal areas in the southwest of the country” (6).  
The second reason is that, in the dry season, the 
groundwater reserve amounts to less than 2% of 
total renewable water resources, yet due to lack 
of dams and canals, this forms a major source of 
irrigation water. When irrigation is most needed, 
farmers suffer water shortages due to erratic power 
supply, which limits their capacity to operate elec-
tric pumps to access the shallow and deep aquifers.   
Yet, despite this ‘dry-season drought’ situation, over 
the past four decades, about half of the funds spent 
on water development has been for embankments 
for flood control and drainage projects. A further 
consequence  of  these  embankment  projects  has 
been a gradual reduction in the fertility of the soil 
due to preventing the natural siltation associated 
with flooding. Farmers living within embankments 
may be able to multiple crops—rice and other ce-
reals, but they report needing increasing amounts 
of artificial fertilizers each season. It is not only em-
bankments which affect crop production, but 
“man-made soil degradation is mainly due to con-
tinuous rice monoculture, inadequate soil conser-
vation measures, and unbalanced fertilizer use” (7). 
Unless major changes are made in access to water 
sources for irrigation in the dry season, agricultural 
production will not increase significantly. The op-
timistic view is that food production will keep pace 
with the growing population at least until 2010, 
when requirements of food-grains will be 31 mil-
lion metric tonnes (mt), and production will be 
about 30 million mt. These national averages may 
conceal household-level variations. For example, 
assuming a daily per-capita requirement of 454 g of 
food-grains, an average family of five would need 
825 kg annually. With average agricultural land-
holding at 0.2 acres and average production at 4 
mt per acre, the typical agricultural family can cur-
rently produce almost exactly their intake require-
ments of 0.8 mt (800 kg). However, this leaves no 
excess for sale and for supporting the population in 
non-agricultural households in the country.
The National Water Management Plan may con-
tribute to changes in patterns of water extraction 
that may alleviate some of this problem, but if agri-
cultural production does not increase, what will be 
the trend for agricultural employment?
The latest figures suggest that, compared to the 
mid-1990s, the numbers working in agriculture are 
about 17.2 million males and 5.8 million females 
and are stagnating or declining. Figures on small 
or zero land-holdings by farming households are 
elusive. The 1996 agricultural census indicates that 
10.2% of farm households owned no land at all, 
followed by 79.87% holding between 0.05 and 
2.49 acres (0.02-1 ha) (8). This range is not useful as 
it covers impossibly small areas to reasonably large 
areas, but includes most farm households. What 
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clined between the 1983-1984 and the 1996 agri-
cultural census, and the overall average farm size 
has fallen by one-quarter from 2.26 acres to 1.69 
acres (8). Measures of landlessness are complicated, 
but it appears that, from the early 1980s to the mid-
1990s, landlessness fell from 56% to 50%; however, 
micro-level evidence suggests that the “rate might 
have slowed down in recent times in part as a con-
sequence of the escalation in the pace or rural-ur-
ban migration” (7).
These trends suggest that agriculture will not ab-
sorb the continuing growth of population into the 
economically-productive labour force. Thus, the 
continuing short-term growth in the rural areas 
of around two million annually will have to find 
other sources of employment, of which there are 
a few, or they will be driven into the cities looking 
for work. The latter is the most likely scenario. By 
2025, when rural populations are expected to stop 
growing, migration to urban areas will then bal-
ance the annual natural increase of 1.3 million.
It is worthwhile to point out that the area of cul-
tivable land is not static. It is constantly under 
threat from the need for land for other uses. Be-
tween 1983-1984 and 1997, the area of cultivable 
crop-land declined by almost 14% while the area 
for homestead increased by 20%; adjacent ponds 
and other residential uses increased by another 
20%, consuming over 300,000 acres of crop-land. 
The growth of district-level small cities and towns 
is now having a noticeable impact: “urbanization 
offers the greatest substantive threat to total land 
available for agricultural use” (7).
Another aspect of the ‘water paradox’ is that glob-
al trends in climate change pose threats of rising 
sea-levels which may inundate coastal areas and 
further reduce available agricultural land by both 
direct flooding and salination of the aquifer, as is 
already occurring in Barisal. This prospect is dis-
cussed further below.
Finally, in this brief overview, the potential cata-
strophic impact of the proposed plans to divert 
many major rivers passing through India will not 
be discussed. Obviously, if this had occurred, Ban-
gladesh would be deprived of currently-available 
transboundary surface water. The only positive 
aspect of such a scheme might be a reduction in 
numbers of people rendered homeless by the pe-
rennial problem of river erosion.  
River erosion is believed to swallow nearly 25,000 
acres (10,000 ha) each year, leaving some 60,000 
people homeless. It is predicted to consume 3,575 
sq km by 2025. The Brahmaputra and Jamuna riv-
ers alone are said to have contributed to one mil-
lion rural inhabitants being driven into poverty, 
and forced to relocate, with the trend in recent de-
cades of moving to the cities in search of work.  Ac-
cording to Oxfam, up to 90% of trafficked women 
and children are victims of river erosion, forced to 
migrate from their rural homes.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS IMPACT ON 
BANGLADESH
There is a growing recognition that climate change 
in terms of global warming precipitating rising 
sea-levels is a genuine harmful phenomenon and 
is a potential threat to low-lying countries, such 
as Bangladesh. Surprisingly, there appears to have 
been a few simulation exercises to try to predict 
how many people and how much land would be 
affected by rising sea-levels. While accepting that 
the rate of climate change will be determined by 
many factors, and by circumstances already in 
place, the simulations by University of Middle-
sex, UK, suggest that South Asia will be massively 
affected, with up to 55 million people affected by 
flooding, if there is no change in their present lev-
els of CO2 emissions and atmospheric warming (9). 
This impact could be reduced to 20 million if CO2 
emissions are stabilized at 750 ppm [Pre-industriali-
zation levels averaged around 280 ppm], and to 10 
million if reduced to 550 ppm.  
Two qualifications here are that many of those af-
fected in South Asia will be on the Indian coast, but 
Bangladesh currently has around 30 million people 
living in vulnerable coastal areas and islands in the 
Bay of Bengal. The second qualification is that the 
time scale is believed to be relatively long in politi-
cal, if not geological, terms. The Hadley Centre for 
Climate Prediction and Research estimates that sea-
levels will rise about 40 cm (15 inches) by 2080.
It is frustratingly difficult to find suitable topo-
graphic maps to allow estimates of the current 
population potentially affected by a certain rise in 
sea-level. An alternative and more pessimistic pre-
diction by GRID Arendal (Fig. 6) is that sea-level 
might rise 1.5 metres by 2030, in which case 22,000 
sq km (16%) of land area would be affected, equiva-
lent to some 34 million population. This latter es-
timate is quite dated by now, and new estimates 
are needed. The SURVAS project (www.survas.mdx.
ac.uk) is in the process of updating some of these 
simulations for the developing world (9).Streatfield PK and  Karar ZA Population challenges for Bangladesh
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A recent study has suggested a catastrophic pos-
sibility of sea-levels rising by as much as six me-
tres by 2100 due to more rapid-than-expected 
melting of the polar ice-caps (10). Such an event 
would swamp vast areas of Bangladesh and cause 
extreme hardship and damage to agriculture and 
other crops, e.g. pond-based shrimp production, 
even if there was time to warn and relocate coastal 
residents (See current and projected coast lines of 
Bangladesh.)
CONCLUSIONS
Bangladesh has achieved considerable success in 
reducing fertility but population momentum will 
carry its population close to 250 million, unless 
something very dramatic and unforeseen occurs to 
bring fertility below replacement level within a de-
cade or two.
Future trends in fertility will depend on further 
improvements in child survival, which has been 
stagnant for the past decade, following impres-
sive gains in the 1980s. It will also depend on the 
changing status of women and girls, and that will 
require continued inputs in primary and second-
ary female education linked with developing for-
mal sector employment opportunities in the rural 
areas, not only in the cities.
A key demographic shift that demands a response 
is the rapid ageing of the population due largely 
to the fertility decline. Numbers of elderly people 
will increase six-fold by mid-century, while num-
bers in the working ages will less than double. This 
decrease in the relative size of the working age tax 
base to the growing demands for healthcare by the 
elderly group, who are more prone to non-com-
municable diseases, should be a matter of concern, 
as Bangladesh evolves health insurance schemes, 
and more expensive health services, in response to 
changing needs.
Even simplistic exercises on the burden of diseases 
can demonstrate how ageing will bring a major 
shift to non-communicable diseases, with conse-
quent change in demand for more expensive and 
more sophisticated health services.
A second demographic phenomenon that demands 
an immediate response is that of rural-urban migra-
tion. The above review of the future of rural agricul-
ture suggests that Bangladesh is close to the limits 
of availability of agricultural land and productivity, 
at least in the short-term. This is, partly, due to chal-
lenging problems of satisfactorily controlling the 
flow and timing of water for irrigation and, partly, 
due simply to the very high population densities in 
the rural areas.
The inevitable consequence of this situation will 
be urbanization on a scale which risks overwhelm-
ing the capacity of the urban authorities to provide 
housing, water and sanitation, healthcare, educa-
tion, and other essential services to incoming mi-
grants. A recent study and mapping of slums indi-
cates that they are growing at over 7% per annum, 
implying a doubling time of less than a decade.   
This frightening scenario requires an immediate 
strengthening of urban planning and consider-
ation of how to slow the pace of movement away 
from rural areas.
How are these challenges consistent with the 
MDGs?
The following list shows the targets within the 
MDGs that are potentially affected by population 
growth. In some cases, the effect is more direct 
than in others.
MDG 1—Target 1: Halve the proportion of 
poor people
Fertility is 60% higher among the poorest quintile 
than among the least poor. However, the poorest 
group is growing faster, and the child survival is 
lower.
MDG 1—Target 2: Halve the proportion of 
hungry people
Food production has kept pace with population 
growth for the past few decades, but may not con-
tinue due to reaching the limits of domestic agri-
cultural production.
MDG 2—Target 3: Ensure that boys and girls 
can complete primary schooling
The number of children eligible for primary school-
ing has now stabilized and will not increase further. 
This should facilitate planning and hopefully im-
plementation.
MDG 4—Target 5: Reduce under-five 
mortality rates
There is evidence that the fertility decline has re-
duced numbers of childhood deaths, if not rates. 
It has reduced selected high-risk pregnancies. Some 
risks, such as drowning, may have increased due to 
reduced toddler supervision.
MDG 5—Target 6: Reduce the maternal 
mortality ratio
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pregnancies and the absolute numbers of maternal 
deaths considerably. There is potential for further 
reductions, if early childbearing can be reduced by 
delaying marriage.
MDG 6—Target 7: Reverse the spread of 
HIV/AIDS
Factors  accelerating  rural-urban  migration  con-
tribute to changing family structures where young 
women and young men are exposed to risks of ur-
ban life. These exposures were not found in tradi-
tional Bangladeshi life. The poverty-driven search 
for employment can result in circumstances where 
high-risk behaviours become acceptable.
MDG 6—Target 8: Reverse the incidence of 
malaria and TB
Rising population densities can force people to mi-
grate to malaria-endemic rural areas, thus adding 
to the populations at risk of resistant Plasmodium 
falciparum malaria. High-density living and crowd-
ing is a risk factor for air-borne diseases, such as TB.   
Other infectious diseases, e.g. pneumonia and diar-
rhoeal diseases, are likely to increase due to crowd-
ing and unsanitary conditions. Global warming 
will likely increase the risk for certain vectorborne 
diseases, e.g. dengue.
MDG 7—Target 10: Access to safe water and 
basic sanitation
As described, rapid urbanization will create possibly 
insurmountable pressures on safe water supplies, 
and the insecure tenure of slum-life, tends to be as-
sociated with lack of basic services, as governments 
are reluctant to provide them even if resources are 
available.
MDG 7—Target 11: Improve the lives of 
slum-dwellers
As above, governments historically tend to avoid 
providing services to slum-dwellers in fear that it 
will simply pull more rural migrants into the cities.
MDG 8—Target 16: Strategies for decent 
and productive work for youth
In a slowly-modernizing economy, the rapid growth 
in numbers of youths seeking employment can ex-
ceed the capacity of the private and public sectors 
to generate jobs.
MDG 8—Target 17: Provide access to afford-
able, essential drugs
The steady shift towards non-communicable dis-
eases resulting from ageing of the population—a 
direct result of the fertility decline—will carry ma-
jor implications for the types and costs of drugs 
and health services for managing common health 
problems.
THE WAY FORWARD
Fertility: Evidence suggests that the recent cessation 
of outreach family-planning services has selectively 
disadvantaged the poor, among whom fertility has 
risen. If this is true, the importance of services for 
different population subgroups need to be better 
understood. The same pattern may also apply to 
women in Sylhet, who may be economically bet-
ter-off, but have limited mobility. Their fertility has 
been consistently higher than in other parts of the 
country. Learning how to develop health systems 
to identify high-fertility families and target these 
families for additional services will be a challenge 
to the health system.  
The way forward
•	 Targeting	family-planning	programmes	to	
high-parity families and those at high risk of 
unintended pregnancies.
•	 Emphasizing	longer-term	methods	for	fami-
ly planning.
•	 Preparing	for	urbanization—improving	ur-
ban infrastructure and a skilled workforce.
•	 Prevent	and	control	diseases	of	urban	slums:	 	
tuberculosis, enteric infections, pneumonia, 
and violence.
•	 Prepare	for	and	provide	health	services	for	
urban areas.
Family planning: Bangladesh still has a pattern 
in the use of short-term family-planning methods 
which are rather inefficient where most women 
marry while young and complete their childbear-
ing in their mid-twenties, leaving another 20 years 
of fertile life to ensure protection from unwanted 
pregnancies. It is possible that (justifiable) concerns 
about poor quality of care and fear of surgical proce-
dures underlie much of the hesitation to adopt long-
term or permanent contraceptive methods. Much 
has been said about this, but little improvement has 
eventuated. What can be done about this?
Rural-urban  migration/urbanization:  Does 
the provision of microcredit used for income and 
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urban migration? Many rural people migrate to 
urban areas with the hope of finding employment. 
In many cases, this hope remains unfulfilled. What 
is the nature of employment in the urban informal 
sector, and how can employment opportunities be 
increased in urban areas? Is there a role for urban 
microcredit? Can it be linked to other direct health 
interventions?
Water and sanitation: What can be done to im-
prove water and sanitation and to minimize wa-
ter-borne diseases in slum conditions? How much 
is social mobilization effective in creating groups 
who can organize, for example, funds to sink func-
tional deep tubewells? Or use community savings 
to construct safe, hygienic latrines?
There are numerous examples, from neighbouring 
countries, of group formation to alleviate the pol-
lution of surface water supplies for urban dwellers. 
This tends to involve blocking raw sewerage outlets 
into city-lakes, preventing industrial wastes from 
entering city-lakes and ponds, and exposing and 
preventing further unauthorized land-grabbing of 
wetlands in urban zones. In addition to expand-
ing the supply of available water for domestic use, 
it can reduce monsoon flooding in the vulnerable 
low-lying slums.
Drug use, violence, and illegal behaviours: The 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is likely to start among drug 
users in Bangladesh. They are not uniquely urban, 
but urban conditions tend to be associated with 
this and other illegal behaviours. What underlies 
this tendency? What can be done to minimize it 
and to redirect young people into more meaning-
ful and productive activities?
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